ABSTRACT Searchable public key encryption (SPE) that supports multi-keywords search, allows data users to retrieve encrypted files of interest efficiently, and thus it has been intensively studied during recent years. However, most existing SPE solutions focus on the exact keyword matching, which fails to capture the semantic information of documents. In this paper, we develop a novel SPE scheme supporting semantic multi-keywords search over the encrypted data. Our solution is mainly built on two techniques: one is a shallow neural network model called ''word2vec'' for capturing the semantic keywords from documents; the other is a keywords conversion method which can convert keywords into a set of vectors. We then utilize an efficient inner product encryption scheme to encrypt these converted vectors and develop the target SPE scheme, which is proven to be secure against chosen keywords attacks. Moreover, we also present both theoretical and experimental analysis to verify the efficiency and accuracy of this scheme. The experiments over a real-world dataset demonstrate that our scheme can obtain a practical performance in terms of time and space complexities. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time to construct semantic keywords search scheme over encrypted data in the public key setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of cloud computing and services, more and more enterprises and individuals store their large-scale data on the cloud platforms in order to decrease operation cost. However, since cloud service providers are not entirely trusted, the data stored on the cloud platforms may be leaked to the unauthorized person or organizations. A straightforward way to solve the this security concern is encrypting sensitive data before outsourcing them. This simple method is very inconvenient for data retrieval. For example, if users want to search files or records satisfying a query condition, they must download all the ciphertext data, decrypt it locally. After these complicated operations, they can perform the query on these plaintext. Therefore, it requires significant cost of transmission, storage and computation. Searchable encryption (SE) can support keywords
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Amjad Mehmood. search without decrypting the data. Thus, these schemes avoid massive aforementioned computations and have been widely studied and developed in recent years.
Generally speaking, the SE can be classified as two types: searchable symmetric-key encryption (SSE) and searchable public-key encryption (SPE). SSE requires that data senders and data receivers hold the same symmetric key to generate ciphertexts. If one of the data sender is compromised by an adversary, all the other senders' data will be leaked. Thus, it is impractical in some real-world applications, such as personal healthcare record (PHR) [1] , encrypted e-mail (EEM) [2] and wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [3] . Taking PHR as an example, Alice's PHR data comes from many sources (data senders), such as a doctor's prescription, hospital medical records and household sensor monitoring results, and so on. Alice's PHR data is encrypted by using the searchable public key (SPE) scheme and sent to the cloud. When Alice (data receiver) wants to query these PHRs, she can encrypt the query and sends it to the cloud. After that, the cloud performs search operation and returns the related PHR data to Alice. In this scenario, the security requirements can be summarized as follows: 1) Any data senders can generate encrypted data; 2) only data receiver can query and decrypt encrypted data; 3) except for the data receiver, none of other entities including the cloud servers, can know the content of the encrypted data. According to these security requirements, we can argue that SPE is very suitable for these applications, where there are many data senders and only a few authorized data receivers.
The very first SPE scheme supporting keyword search was introduced by Boneh et al., and it is so-called public key with keyword search (PEKS) [2] . After this, many SPE schemes [4] - [7] supporting multi-keywords search were proposed to achieve advanced keywords search, for example, conjunctive, disjunctive, subset and Boolean keywords search. Note that all these SPE schemes support only exact keywords search, that is to say, only documents matching the query keywords exactly can be returned. Considering the following motivating example, as shown in Fig. 1 , for the query word ''Beijing'', only document ''03'' is returned by adopting exact keyword matching. Obviously, this method fails to capture the semantic relationships among terms ''Beijing'', ''Capital'',''City'', and ''China''. So, under this situation, user may not reasonably perform search operations to meet their true query intentions. Motivated by this problem, we first need to develop a new approach supporting semantic keyword search, which means that documents ''01,02,03'' are all returned for the query word ''Beijing'' (Fig. 1) . Then, through utilizing this technique over the encrypted data, we develop a SPE scheme supporting semantic multi-keywords search (SPE-SMKS). More precisely, by taking advantage of a term representation method called ''Word2vec'' [8] , we first create a dictionary for all keywords in a corpus, where each keyword in this dictionary is associated with several semantically related keywords. After this, we extend each document's keyword set to a new keyword set including some new keywords which are semantically related with the keywords in the old keyword set. Finally, through converting a query and an index keyword set into a predicate and an attribute vector, respectively, we propose a concrete SPE-SMKS scheme based on an efficient inner product encryption (IPE) scheme. 
A. MAIN WORKS
The main works are summarized as follows:
1) With the help of the term representations method called ''Word2vec'', we present an approach for building a semantic index for each encrypted document. This semantical index consists of a group of semantic keyword for the document which can help us to realize semantic keywords search. 2) By utilizing a keyword conversion method, the semantic index and query keyword set can be changed into an attribute and a predicate vector, respectively. Through applying an efficient IPE scheme to encrypt the attribute and predicate vectors, we construct a concrete SPE-SMKS scheme to achieve semantical query. Our scheme is proven to be secure against the chosen keywords attack. Note that, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time to explore the problem of semantical multi-keyword search over encrypted data under the public key setting. 3) We use a widely-used data collection in information retrieval as the experiment dataset. Based on this dataset, we adopt a standard IR metrics called ''precision'' and ''recall'' to verify the retrieval accuracy of our scheme. Compared with the previous SPE scheme, this metrics can better reflect the quality of the search results. As a result, the rigorous analysis and experiments on the real-world dataset show that our proposed scheme is more accurate than the previous scheme which adopts exact keyword matching. In addition, compared with SPE schemes proposed recently, the experiment also shows that the time and space cost in our scheme is very practical.
Related work. As stated previously, the searchable encryption scheme supporting multi-keywords search can be mainly categorized into two types according to its application scenarios: searchable public key encryption (SPE) and symmetric key encryption (SSE). In this part, we will introduce some works related to our work according to these two categories.
B. SSE
Song et al. first proposed the definition of searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) and gave a concrete scheme [9] . After this, many works [10] , [11] aim to create SSE scheme supporting multi-keyword query. However, the search time in these schemes is linear to the number of documents. To improve the search efficiency, by taking advantage of tree structures, such as r-tree and kd-tree, SSE schemes with sub-linear search time were released in [12] , [13] . Kuzu et al. [14] and Fu et al. [15] proposed SSE schemes for fuzzy keywords query that relies on a concept called keyword distance. If the distance between the query and index is less than a preset threshold, it indicates that the query matches with index. In order to return the query results more accurate, sorting query results is also an important research point. Recently, SSE schemes that can quickly search top-k related documents were presented in [16] and [17] .
C. SPE
The first SPE scheme supporting keyword search called public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was proposed by Boneh et al. [2] . In order to complete the concept of PEKS, Abdalla et al. defined the computational and statistical VOLUME 7, 2019 consistency of PEKS, and gave a concrete scheme [18] . But, these works only support a single keyword search. The first SPE scheme supporting conjunctive keywords search was proposed by Park et al. [4] , and was named by public key encryption with conjunctive keywords search. Note that this scheme needs keyword fields as compulsory information, which is not needed for many applications. For example, the keyword list of a scientific paper is arranged in the alphabetical order. Each keyword in the keyword list doesn't need a keyword field. To overcome this problem, PECK without keyword fields was proposed by Zhang et al. [19] . Although the progress of PECK was rather rapid, the emergence of SPE scheme supporting disjunctive keywords search was relatively slow. The first public key encryption with disjunctive keywords search (PEDK) scheme was introduced by Katz et al. [5] . In their work, they proposed a novel encryption scheme called predicate encryption supporting inner product (IPE). Through converting the index and query keywords into a predicate and an attribute vector, we can construct a PEDK scheme based on the IPE scheme. For supporting advanced search function, Zhang et al. proposed two SPE schemes supporting conjunctive and disjunctive keyword search simultaneously [24] , [25] . Wu et al. proposed a SPE scheme supporting Boolean keywords search by utilizing an expression tree [30] . The SPE scheme with fuzzy keywords search was given in [7] . To improve the query speed, by using a special hidden structure, Xu et al. proposed two SPE schemes supporting single keyword search [3] , [20] whose search performance are very close to a practical SSE scheme. In order to improve the security of SPE, Zhu et al. proposed a SPE scheme with access control by using the access tree [21] . To ensure that the search results returned from the cloud are authentic, the works in [22] introduced a trusted third party to verify the query results. The SPE scheme with the abilities of verifiable and access control was proposed in [23] .
We show some recently proposed SPE schemes in Table 1 . Based on Table 1 , there is no SPE scheme that supports semantic multi-keywords search. Taking inspiration from this point, our paper is devoted to building a novel SPE scheme supporting such a function.
D. ORGANIZATION
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give a formal definition and security model of SPE-SMKS, and also introduce some backgrounds related to our work. In Section 3, the method of creating a semantical keywords search scheme is presented, and a concrete SPE-SMKS is also given. The security analysis is given in Section 4. The theoretical and experimental analysis is given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 gives the conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we give the definitions of the framework and security model of SPE-SMKS. In addition, we will briefly introduce some tools adopted in our scheme, including the definition of predicate-only inner product encryption (PO-IPE) and a famous term representation method in the field of IR called ''word2vec''. The main notations used in this paper are summerized in Table 2 . 
A. THE PROPOSED SPE-SMKS FRAMEWORK
The SPE-SMKS framework consists of three roles: data sender, data receiver and server provider. The flow of SPE-SMKS is listed as follows.
1) The data receiver generates the receiver's public key (pk) and secret key (sk), respectively, where pk is open to the public and sk can be only accessed by the receiver. Moreover, in order to preserve the confidentiality of documents, data senders and data receiver will share a session key to encrypt the documents.
2) The data senders build a semantic dictionary from the documents. In this dictionary, each keyword is associated with k keywords semantically related to this keyword, where the parameter k is set by senders. 3) Through the semantic dictionary, the data sender extends the keyword set {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n } of message M to a new keyword set {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n } which contains a group of keywords semantically related to the previous keyword set. The data sender encrypts the new keyword set to generate a searchable encrypted index for M by using pk. The data sender also encrypts M by using the session key, and sends both M and the corresponding encrypted index of M to the server provider. 4) The data receiver can make a keywords query including a specific list of keywords. By utilizing these keywords and sk, the data receiver generates a trapdoor, and sends it to the server provider. 5) The server provider can execute keywords search over the encrypted indices. The server can test each encrypted index against the trapdoor, and returns the matched messages to the receiver. An illustration of this flow is shown in Fig. 2 
Otherwise, it holds with negligible probability.
Actually, in the SPE-SMKS scheme, the ciphertext of a message M holds the form of {Enc(sk, M ), IndexBuild(pk, W )}, where Enc(·) is a secure tradition encryption scheme, and the result of IndexBuild(pk, W ) is the index of M . In the real-time application with constrained resources, the message M can be encrypted by utilizing a secure symmetric key encryption scheme, e.g., AES, Triple DES. In this setting, the receiver and the sender can share a session key to encrypt the documents. Like the previous SPE works, we mainly focus on the searchable encryption part.
B. SECURITY DEFINITION OF SPE-SMKS
For the security notion, pk and D can be accessed by any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries. Adversaries can adaptively query the trapdoors of chosen keyword sets. The essential of the security of SPE-SMKS means that for a pair of challenge ciphertexts, the adversary fails to distinguish these two ciphertexts under the restriction that these two ciphertexts cannot be distinguished by trapdoors which the adversary queried in the previous phase.
According to the above description, we propose the security definition of SPE-SMKS similar to definition presented in [4] According to the game mentioned above, we define A's advantage in the above game as:
2 | The essential of this security definition is to insure that the encrypted form of these two challenge keyword sets are computationally indistinguishable to the adversary A.
C. WORD2VEC
''Word2Vec'' (word to vector) is a model for converting words into vector form [8] . These models are shallow, two-layer neural networks, which is trained to reconstruct linguistic texts. After training, the ''Word2Vec'' model can be used to map each word to a vector, which is used to calculate the similarity between words. For example, Fig. 3 shows three vectors for three words ''apple'', ''banana'', and ''book'', respectively, through training a simple corpus. From  Fig. 3 , one can calculate the similarity among these three words by adopting the metric of cosine similarity. Through computation, we can find ''apple'' and ''banana'' are more semantically closer than ''apple'' and ''book'' since both ''apple'' and ''banana'' are fruits, which means that the semantic information of words can be captured according to the context of the corpus.
By adopting ''Word2Vec'', we train a corpus to create a semantical dictionary in which each keyword is associated with k most semantically similar words. The new dictionary can be used to create a semantic encrypted index for SPE-SMKS, which will be introduced in the subsequent sections.
D. FRAMEWORK OF PO-IPE
Our SPE-SMKS scheme is based on an efficient and secure PO-IPE scheme [26] . We introduce the framework of PO-IPE presented in [26] as follows.
In an PO-IPE scheme, a ciphertext is associated with an attribute vector x and a secret key is corresponding with a predicate vector v. If the secrete key can decrypt the ciphertext, it means that v · x = 0. The original definition of PO-IPE was presented in [5] , and is introduced as follows. The security of our scheme relies on the security of the PO-IPE scheme since the concrete scheme is based on a PO-IPE scheme. For better understanding the security of our scheme in the next section, we introduce the security definition of PO-IPE presented in [26] . 
III. METHOD OF SEMANTIC MULTI-KEYWORDS SEARCH OVER ENCRYPTED DATA
This section will introduce the method of performing semantic multi-keywords search over encrypted data in the public key setting. The method contains two parts: 1) constructing a semantic index; 2) converting a keyword set into a vector. The details of these two parts are described in the following two subsections.
A. APPROACH FOR BUILDING SEMANTIC INDEX
SPE schemes usually utilize the method of keywords matching to realize the retrieval function over encrypted data. Note that this exact matching method fails to achieve the semantic keywords search. So, we need to find an alternative method to support semantic keywords search. The core idea of this method is to extend the keyword set in each document to a new keyword set holding some semantic meaning. The detail of this method is described as follows.
1) We use all documents' keywords to create a dictionary. Note that all the meaningless words, such as numbers, symbols, and stop words, are deleted in the dictionary. 2) By utilizing the tool of ''word2vec'', we calculate the k nearest neighbors of each word in the dictionary. From Fig. 4 , we can find that each keyword w i in the dictionary D is associated with k words which are semantically related with w i , where i ∈ [1, d]. 3) Let the keyword set of each document be W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n }. The algorithm will extend W to a semantic keyword set W . The process is illustrated in Fig. 4 . From Fig. 4 , for each keyword w i in W , the algorithm first looks up the dictionary and finds k semantic keywords w i1 , w i2 , . . . , w ik , where i ∈ [1, n] . Then, the algorithm inserts these keywords into the semantic keyword set w . Finally, it generates a new keyword set W as the document's semantic index, where W = {w 11 , w 12 , . . . , w 1k , w 21 , w 22 , . . . , w 2k , . . . , w n1 , w n2 , . . . , w nk }, and w ij is the j-th nearest word for word w i . It is easy to find that the obtained semantic index holds the semantic information of the original keyword set. Thus, we can encrypt this index to realize the secure semantic multi-keywords search.
B. KEYWORDS CONVERSION METHOD
We use the ''Enc'' and ''KeyGen'' algorithms in the PO-IPE scheme to construct the encrypted index and the trapdoor in the SPE-SMKS scheme, respectively. Note that the inputs of the ''Enc'' and ''KeyGen'' algorithms are an attribute vector and a predicate vector, respectively. Thus, intuitively, we should convert the query and the index keywords into a predicate vector and an attribute vector respectively. In the following paragraph, the method of changing keyword sets into a vector space model is presented.
We first define a function H 1 : {0, 1} * → Z * p . This function can map a keyword w ∈ {0, 1} * to a integer. Let p be a large prime which is larger than the size of the dictionary. So, H 1 can be collision-resistance, which means that, if i = j, then H 1 (w i ) = H 1 (w j ), where w i and w j are two distinct keywords. Then, the details of this method is described as follows.
1) For the semantic keyword set W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n }, we create a function:
= a n x n + a n −1 x n −1
The coefficients of the f (x) can be built as a vector a = {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n }. The vector a can be seen as an index of W 2) For the query keyword set Q = {q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q m }, a vector x = {x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n } can be obtained, where
3) Note that if there is Q ⊆ W , it is easy to find that a· x = 0. This property can be used for the keywords search. Since W contains many semantic keywords related to the original keyword set, W can be seen as a semantic index for the corresponding document. Moreover, through converting W and Q into an attribute vector and a predicate vector, respectively, we can apply the PO-IPE scheme to realize the SPE-SMKS scheme, which will be proposed in next section.
IV. PROPOSED SPE-SMKS SCHEME
In this section, we propose a concrete SPE-SMKS scheme through combining the methods presented in Sec.III to a PO-IPE scheme introduced in [26] . Specifically, we first extend the original index keyword set to a new keyword set which contains many semantic keywords related to the previous keyword set. Then, we convert the query and index keyword set to a predicate vector and an attribute vector, respectively. Finally, by applying the PO-IPE scheme to encrypt the predicate and attribute vectors, a SPE-SMKS scheme can be built. Moreover, in order to verify the security VOLUME 7, 2019 of our scheme, a detailed security proof for the SPE-SMKS scheme is also given. IPE , c, sk v ) , where pk IPE , msk IPE , x, v, c, and sk v represent the public key, the master secret key, the attribute vector, the predicate vector, the ciphertext and the secrete key of v, respectively. According to these denotation, our SPE-SMKS scheme is given as follows.
A. A CONCRETE SPE-SMKS SCHEME
• KeyGen(1 n ): Given a security parameter 1 n , this algorithm executes the Setup IPE algorithm to generate pk IPE and msk IPE , and sets pk = pk IPE and sk = msk IPE .
The pk is open to the public.
• DictionaryBuild(F): Given a group of keyword sets for all the documents F = {F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F l }, the algorithm outputs a dictionary D by adopting the tool of ''word2vec''. D can be denoted by: • IndexBuild(pk,W ): For a keyword set W = {w j1 , w j2 , . . . , w jn } ∈ D of a document F j ∈ F, the algorithm extends W to a new keyword set W = {w j11 , w j12 , . . . , w j1k , w j21 , w j22 , . . . , w j2k , . . . , w jn1 , w jn2 , . . . , w jnk } by utilizing the dictionary D. By taking advantage of the keywords conversion method, it converts W into an attribute vector x. After this, it generates I W = Enc IPE (pk, x) as the encrypted index of F j .
• Trapdoor(sk,Q): Given a query keyword set Q = {q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q m }, the algorithm generates a predicate vector v by utilizing the keywords converting method. Then, it generates T Q by making use of KeyGen IPE (sk, pk, v), and outputs T Q as a trapdoor of the query Q.
• Test(pk, T Q , I W ): The algorithm computes R = Dec IPE (pk, I W , T Q ). If R = 1, the algorithm outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
B. SECURITY PROOF
Since the proposed SPE-SMKS scheme is based on the fully secure PO-IPE scheme, we have the following proposition. Proposition 1: If the PO-IPE scheme is secure, then our SPE-SMKS scheme is secure.
Proof Sketch. If there is a PPT algorithm A which can break the SPE-SMKS scheme, we can use A to break the PO-IPE scheme. The detail of the security proof is given as follows. 
}. By making use of the KeyGen IPE algorithm, C generates a set of trapdoors {T Q (1) , T Q (2) , . . . , T Q (t) } for the queries, where each trapdoor is a decryption key for the PO-IPE scheme. 3) Challenge: After phase 1, A randomly chooses two challenge keyword sets W 0 and W 1 , and extends these two sets to two new semantic keyword sets W 0 and W 1 by using the dictionary D. Note that, for each trapdoor Q (i) queried in Phase 1, these two sets satisfy one of the following constraints:
⊂ W 0 and Q (i) ⊂ W 1 . Then, C flips a coin β ∈ {0, 1} and generates an index I W β by taking advantage of the algorithm Enc IPE . Finally, C gives the index I W β to A, where I W β can be reckon as a challenge ciphertext of PO-IPE. 4) Phase 2: A can continue ask C for trapdoors which subject to the restriction described above. These trapdoors can still seen as a group of decryption keys for PO-IPE. 5) Response: Finally, A outputs a guess β . This guess can also be regarded as a guess for the security game of PO-IPE. If A can output a correct guess under the security game of SPE-SMKS, the value of |Pr[β = β] − 1 2 | is not negligible, which means that the two challenge indices can be distinguished. Because these two challenge indices can be seen as the two challenge ciphertexts in the security game of PO-IPE, and the game process of SPE-SMKS is consistent with that of PO-IPE, we can use A to distinguish these two challenge ciphertexts, which means that A can break the PO-IPE scheme.
C. OTHER SECURITY REQUIREMENT
The aforementioned security proof is against the chosen keyword attack. In the real-time application, the proposed scheme needs to withstand some other attacks. In the following paragraphs, we describe some variations of our formal proposal, to withstand more attacks, e.g., offline keyword guessing attack, known keywords attack, and modification attack (which is also called search results verification).
1) OFFLINE KEYWORDS ATTACK
Jeong et al. [31] pointed that the consistency implies insecurity of a SPE scheme against keyword guessing attacks, since pk can be accessed by anyone, and anyone can create the secure index. When trapdoors are obtained by attackers, attackers can run keyword guessing attack to guess the keywords contained in the indices and trapdoors. If we limit the adversary's ability to generate the trapdoors and indices of the challenge keywords simultaneously, the scheme can defend against the offline guessing attack. Inspired by the idea in [30] , we apply the ''pre-tag'' mechanism to the proposed SPE-SMKS scheme for defending the keyword guessing attack. 1) If the adversary is a outsider attacker or the malicious insider server, the adversary cannot perform keyword guessing attack since the adversary fails to produce a correct index for any keyword. 2) If the adversaries are a group of collusive senders, they can acquire the pre-tags of keywords which they should not know. However, they fail to obtain the corresponding trapdoors associated to these pre-tags. Thus, the variant scheme is still against the keyword guessing attack. 3) If the adversaries are a group of senders colluding with the server, they can obtain all the pre-tags, trapdoors and indices. In this case, we should adopt some special methods to defend this attack. For a method introduced in [30] , the data receiver keeps some keywords as a special keyword set, and the pre-tags of these keywords in this special set are only given to some trusted senders. Under the above analysis, we argue that the proposed variant scheme can defend against the offline keyword guessing attack.
2) KNOWN KEYWORD ATTACK
In the real-time application, the server could not deduce any keyword from the trapdoor, which means that trapdoors cannot leak any information about the query keywords by utilizing the knowledge of keywords. In order to address this issue, inspired by the idea in [17] and [20] , we add the extra randomness on the index and trapdoor.
In the variant scheme's IndexBuild algorithm, like the original IndexBuild algorithm, the index keyword set W is first converted into an attribute x. Then, the variant IndexBuild algorithm randomly chooses a number r, and sets r x. If x · v = 0, the scalar multiplication operation of x doesn't affect the result of x · v = 0 due to x · v = r x · v = 0. Since the test algorithm is verifying whether x · v = 0, we can use the above property to add the randomness for indices.
For the trapdoor, the variant Trapdoor algorithm extends the original query keyword set Q to a new set Q . For each keyword q in Q, randomly choosing a number k ∈ [1, k], we choose k semantic keywords related to q by utilizing the dictionary, and insert these keywords into the Q . Note that since k is choosing dynamically, the same Q will generate two different Q . By taking advantage of keyword conversion method, the variant algorithm changes Q into a predicate vector v, and then sets v = s v, where s is a random number.
Through the above two points, given any two trapdoors, the cloud server cannot determine whether they have any relationship, which means that the SPE-SMKS scheme can defend the known keyword attack. Note that this method will lower the accuracy of search results. But, as the analysis mentioned in [20] , it is inevitable since we should disturb the search results to make the trapdoor unlinkability.
3) VERIFICATION OF SEARCH RESULTS
In the real-time application, because the data is stored on the cloud server, it inevitably gives rise to significant security threats of data integrity. More precisely, the adversary can perform modification attack and change the data received on the server side. To address this issue, our scheme needs to a mechanism to verify the search results.
For our scheme, we adopt the signature method introduced in [32] to verify the search results. The signature method is described as follows.
1) Setup(λ):
This algorithm is run by the sender to generate the public key (pk sig ) and secret key (sk sig ) for signature. Given a security parameter λ, it randomly chooses g, g 0 ∈ G 1 , a ∈ Z * p and two hash functions
, and then sets X = g a and X 0 = g a 0 . The pk sig is {X , X 0 , g, g 0 , H 4 , H 5 } and sk sig is a. , data receiver selects a random value r i ∈ Z * p , and sends the challenging value tuple B = {i, r i } to cloud server. When the cloud server receive the tuples, cloud server will respond with the proof information as follows.
-Step 1: It chooses a random number y ∈ Z * p , and computes δ = (X 0 ) y . , φ) to the data receiver. Once the data receiver receives the above tuple, the data receiver checks whether the following equation holds.
If the above equation holds, the data receiver accepts the search results. Otherwise, the data receiver refuses to receive the results. The correctness and security analysis of this signature was given in [32] . In addition, the signature process is independent with the original SPE-SMKS scheme since the signature process only focuses on the ciphertexts rather than secure indices. So, the signature process doesn't affect the security of indices, and the variant SPE-SMKS scheme is still secure against the chosen keyword attack.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the proposed SPE-SMKS scheme theoretically and experimentally to demonstrate that our scheme can efficiently perform semantic keywords search over the encrypted data. We analyze the performance of our scheme from two aspects: 1) the accuracy of our scheme including precision and recall; 2) the time and space overhead of our scheme.
A. EVALUATION SETTINGS
Our experiment is performed on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU at 2.90GHz processor and 16GB memory size. Since the PO-IPE scheme which the SPE-SMKS adopts is based on the bilinear pairing technique, the proposed scheme is constructed by utilizing the Java Pairing Based Cryptography (JPBC) library [27] . The bilinear map used in our FIGURE 5. The comparison between previous schemes with our scheme for precision and recall. (Previous schemes are the schemes adopting exact keywords matching, k = 3, 6, 9, 12 represents our scheme which sets k = 3, 6, 9, 12, respectively.).
scheme is instantiated as Type A pairing (base field size is 128-bit), which provides a level of security equivalent to 1024-bit DLOG [27] . The experiment is based on a real world dataset called ''OHSUMED.87'' [28] , which was created for IR research. In this dataset, there are more than 50000 documents and 106 queries, where each query is associated with a group of relevant documents which are judged by humans. Based on these relevance judgments, we can use the IR metric to verify the search result of the proposed scheme whether is more accurate than that of the previous scheme failing to consider the semantic information of documents. Moreover, in order to demonstrate the efficiency of SPE-SMKS, we also test the time and space cost of the proposed scheme over this dataset. In the following subsections, we analyze our experiment results in term of result accuracy and efficiency.
B. PRECISION AND RECALL
In order to demonstrate that the accuracy of our scheme, we measure our scheme by adopting a standard IR metrics called ''precision'' and ''recall'' [29] over a real-world dataset. The metrics of precision and recall are defined as follows:
where, R q is the set of results retrieved for query q, and rel q (d) is relevance label of document d for query q, where if the query q is relevant to d, rel q (d) = 1; otherwise, 0.
The numerator in both precision and recall is computing the relevant documents retrieved for a query q. But, the denominator for precision is total number of documents in the retrieved set R q , while the denominator for recall is the total number of relevant documents in the collection D. Fig. 5 shows the comparison between the previous schemes, e.g. [25] , [30] , which utilize the exact keywords match with our scheme. Note that an important parameter in our proposed scheme is the number of the semantic keywords extended to the index keyword set. This parameter is denoted by k. From Fig. 5 , as k increased from 3 to 12, we find that the precision increased slightly from 1.9% to 2.34%, and the recall increased significantly from 4.6% to 7.5%. The main reason for this phenomenon is that the number of documents in R q is increasing as k grows. As |R q | grows, more and more relevant documents will be retrieved. According to the above analysis, we can argue that the search accuracy in the proposed scheme is better than that in the previous schemes which adopt exact keyword search method. This result verifies that our scheme can capture the semantic information in the documents and queries.
C. EFFICIENCY 1) THEORETICAL ANALYSIS.
In SPE-SMKS, the number of keywords in the keyword set for each document is n, and is extended to n = nk, where k is the number of keywords which are semantically related to each keyword in the keyword set. According to the keywords conversion method, the dimensions of both attribute vector and predicate vector obtained by this method are n + 1. Since the time and space complexities in the PO-IPE scheme are related with the dimension of the attribute and predicate vectors, the time and space cost of the proposed scheme depends on n + 1. We compare the performance of our scheme with two SPE supporting multi-keywords search schemes [25] , [30] published in the past one year. For simplicity, we denote these two schemes introduced in [25] , [30] by ZLW19 and WLH19, respectively. The theoretical comparisons of time and space complexities between the proposed scheme and these two schemes are given in Table 3 and Table 4 , respectively.
Because the time cost of exponentiation computation and pairing is much more than that of other operations, such as addition and multiplication operations, the comparison only considers these two operations. Table 3 shows that the time cost of index building and test are both less than that in other two schemes since the time cost of pairing operation is much more than that of exponentiation operation. Although the time cost of ''KeyGen'' algorithm in our scheme is slightly more than that in the other two schemes, it doesn't take much time since this algorithm only runs when system initialization and key pair replacement. n and m represent the number of keywords in the index and query, respectively. Because n and m is not big and n is not much bigger than m, we can reckon that the time cost of trapdoor generation in our scheme is at least as efficient as the other two schemes.
From Table 4 , we can find that the storage cost of index in our scheme is much less than that in the other two schemes. Since n is not much bigger than m, and the storage cost of |Z q | is small than that of L 1 , the storage cost of trapdoor in our scheme is still as efficient as the other schemes. In addition, although the storage cost of pk and sk is our scheme is more than that in the other two schemes, our scheme doesn't need a large amount of space to store them since pk and sk are stored only a few copies.
According to the above analysis, we can reckon that the proposed scheme is more efficient than the other two schemes. In the next part, we will use the experiment results to verify the efficiency of our scheme.
2) EXPERIMENT RESULTS.
The experiment results of the time and space cost of WLH19, ZLW19 and ours are illustrated in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 .
a: TIME COST
The time overheads of WLH19, ZLW19, and our scheme are illustrated in Fig. 6 . 1 Key generation. From Fig. 6a , the time cost of key generation in these three schemes are all linear with n. In special, the time cost of key generation in WLH19 is slightly less than that in ZLW19 and ours since it generates less group elements in G 1 . 2 Index building. The Fig. 6b shows that the time cost of index building in WLH19 and ours are both linearly with n, while that in ZLW19 is linear with n 2 . Our scheme is the best of all in the index building phase. 3 Trapdoor generation. As illustrated from Fig. 6c , the time cost of trapdoor generation in ZLW19 and WLH19 is linear with m, not related with n, while that in our scheme is linear with n. Because m is less than n, the time cost of trapdoor generation in our scheme is slightly more than that in ZLW19 and WLH19.
4 Testing. Fig. 6d shows that the time cost of test in these three schemes are all linear with n. Compared with ZLW19 and WLH19, our scheme needs less pairing operations. Since the pairing operation is relatively time-consuming, our solution requires less test time. In addition, in our scheme, we need to build a dictionary. The phase of dictionary building contains three major steps: word extraction from corpus, obtaining the similarity among words, and constructing dictionary in which each word is associated with a group of semantic words. The average time cost for these three steps is nearly 5.5 hours. But, we note that these operations run only one time during the SPE initialization stage. After that, no costly operations are required further. Thus, this time cost is acceptable in practical applications, even though utilizing a huge corpus.
b: STORAGE COST
The storage cost of WLH19, ZLW19, and our scheme is illustrated in Fig. 7 .
(1) pk and sk. As illustrated in Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b , the storage cost of pk and sk in these three schemes are all linear with n. This is fit for the theoretical analysis. The space cost of pk and sk in our scheme is slightly more than that in the other two schemes. As mentioned earlier, this space cost of pk and sk is acceptable in practical applications since pk and sk are only stored a few copies. (2) Index size. Fig. 7c shows that the storage cost of indices in WLH19 and our scheme are both linear with n, while that in ZLW19 is linear with n 2 . Our scheme needs less space for storing index than the other two schemes since the index in our scheme requires less elements in G 1 . (3) Trapdoor Size. From Fig. 7d , The storage cost of trapdoor in our scheme is less than the other two schemes since the size of |Z p | is less than that of |G 1 |.
3) MORE COMMENTS
As shown in the experiment result, when n = 25 and l = 1000, the average time cost of index building is 46.3s, the average generation time of a single trapdoor is 43ms, and the average search time is 38.2s. In addition, according to the previous statistics in [33] , the number of keywords in a document (n) is usually less than 20. Even if the abstract field is used as keywords, the number of keywords in a single document is approximately 200. According to the above statistics and experiment results, considering the fact that the time and space complexities in the proposed scheme are linearly with n, we argue that the proposed scheme is suitable for the applications with less keywords, such as the keywords in the scientific literature, email title and summaries, medical data summaries and so on. In addition, the efficiency of search is an extremely important indicator for a SPE scheme. Considering the index structure in which each documents has its own encrypted index, the search process can be accelerated by utilizing the technique of parallel computation [17] . Moreover, the search process is performed by the cloud server which has strong computing power. Thus, we argue that our scheme is more practical in the cloud platform.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, by combining ''Word2Vec'' and keywords conversion method, we first proposed a SPE scheme supporting semantic multi-keywords search based on an efficient PO-IPE scheme. Moreover, compared with the previous works, we also first use the standard IR metrics (precision and recall) to verify the accuracy of the SPE scheme. The search result in our scheme is more accurate than the previous schemes which adopt the search method of exact keywords match. Moreover, since our scheme is created on an efficient PO-IPE scheme, the proposed scheme is practical in both time and space overhead. Note that the accuracy in our scheme still has a room to improve, the future work is to construct a more accurate scheme based on some recent IR techniques. 
